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Abstract 
In this article, I outline three main philosophical lessons that we may learn from 
Turing’s work, and how they lead to a new philosophy of information.  After a brief 
introduction, I discuss his work on the method of levels of abstraction (LoA), and his 
insistence that questions could be meaningfully asked only by specifying the correct 
LoA. I then look at his second lesson, about the sort of philosophical questions that 
seems to be most pressing today. Finally, I focus on the third lesson, concerning the 
new philosophical anthropology that owes so much to Turing’s work. I then show 
how the lessons learnt are taken up by the philosophy of information. In the 
conclusion, I draw a general synthesis of the points made, in view of the development 
of the philosophy of information itself as a continuation of Turing’s work. 
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Introduction 
When one looks at Turing’s philosophical legacy, there seems to be two risks. One is 
to reduce it to his famous test (Turing 1950). This has the advantage of being clear-
cut. Anybody can recognise the contribution in question and place it within the 
relevant debate on the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The other risk is to dilute it 
down into an all-embracing narrative, making Turing’s ideas the seeds of anything we 
do and know today. This has the advantage of acknowledging the greatness of this 
genius. In both cases, however, we are less likely to identify which conceptual 
contributions by Turing have helped to shape our contemporary philosophical 
discourse, and which can direct its future development.  In order to avoid both risks, 
in the following pages, I shall concentrate on three specific philosophical lessons, 
which seem to be particularly significant in view of the emergence of the philosophy 
of information and its subsequent development. I shall offer not a philological or 
scholarly analysis, but a minimalist, hermeneutical exercise. It is part of Turing’s 
extraordinary genius that other interpreters will learn more and different lessons from 
his intellectual legacy. I wish one day Turing will become as central to our 
philosophical canon as Frege is. 
  The three philosophical lessons to which I wish to attract the reader’s 
attention are:  how Turing’s work on the method of levels of abstraction (LoA) can 
teach us to ask philosophical questions properly; what philosophical questions are 
most pressing today, as a consequence of Turing’s work; and, finally, Turing’s 
influence in shaping our new philosophical anthropology, what I shall call the fourth 
revolution. I will then connect these lessons to the development of the philosophy of 
information, the philosophical field concerned with the critical investigation of the 
conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, 
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utilisation and sciences, and with the elaboration and application of information-
theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. The 
philosophy of information appropriates an explicit, clear and precise interpretation of 
the classic “ti esti” question, namely “what is information?”, the clearest hallmark of a 
new field. As with any other field-question, this too only serves to demarcate an area 
of research, not to map its specific problems in detail, which we have only begun to 
address. In the conclusion I shall argue that even if Turing never developed a 
philosophy of information, the latter would be inconceivable without his legacy and 
the three lessons outlined in this article. 
 
Lesson one: fixing the level of abstraction or how to ask philosophical questions 
Imagine the following scenario. You ask the price of an item, let’s say a second-hand 
car, and you receive the following answer: 5,000. The question concerned a variable, 
the price x of the car in question, and you received an exact numerical value for x, yet 
something is missing. You still have no idea about the price because you do not know 
the type of the variable: is it British pounds, US dollars, euros…? Of course, the 
context usually helps. If you are in England and you are asking a car dealer, your 
question should be understood as concerning the price in British pounds and so should 
the answer. This is trivial, you may think. Grice’s conversational rules obviously 
apply. It is, and they do. But this is also a crucial assumption, easily forgotten. In 
November 1999, NASA lost the $ 125m Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) because the 
Lockheed Martin engineering team used English (also known as Imperial) units of 
measurement, while the agency’s team used the metric system for a key spacecraft 
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operation. As a result, the MCO crashed into Mars.1 Assuming that contexts will 
always disambiguate the types of your variables paves the way to costly mistakes. So 
what has all this got to do with Turing? Quite a lot, as it turns out. To show you why, 
let me introduce a slightly abstract model of factual information.2 
 We can treat factual information of the kind illustrated above by the price of 
the second-had car as a compound of question + answer. If some theoretical 
simplification is allowed, the question may be reduced to a Boolean one, followed by 
a yes or a no answer. In the original version of our example, the price of the second-
hand car then becomes: [is the price of this car 5,000? + yes]. You see immediately 
that the problem lies not in the answer, but in the question: it contains no indication of 
the type of the variable being handled. The correct piece of information is of course: 
[is the price of this car £ 5,000? + yes]. We have just introduced the correct level of 
abstraction or LoA, represented by the symbol for British pounds, not, for example, 
by the symbol € for euros. Now Turing was the first to understand the crucial 
importance of expressing the LoA at which sensible questions may be asked. It might 
seem amazingly obvious, but the second example above, regarding the MCO, shows 
how easy and dangerous it is to forget about implicit LoAs. The importance of being 
clear about one’s own level of abstraction was as obvious as the fact that the earth is 
round, and that America was just there to be discovered. Yet it took Turing’s genius 
to bring it to light. Of course, Turing’s contribution was not that of introducing the 
concept of typed variables, or that of establishing the need for frames of reference. 
These ideas were already common at his time. His lesson was to make clear for the 
first time how philosophical and conceptual questions too could be answered only by 
                                                
1 "Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I Report" (Press release). 
NASA: ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1999/MCO_report.pdf   
2 For an introduction, see (Floridi 2010), for a full philosophical analysis see (Floridi 
2011). 
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fixing the LoA at which it would then make sense to receive an answer. This is one of 
the greatest and lasting contributions of his famous test (Turing 1950), far more 
important than the wrong predictions about when machines would pass it, or what 
consequences one should draw if they did pass it (Floridi, Taddeo et al. 2009). It is 
sometimes forgotten that Turing refused even to try to provide an answer to the 
question “can a machine think?”, because he considered it a problem “too 
meaningless to deserve discussion”. Using our simple example, it would be like 
asking the price of the second-hand car in absolute figures, insisting that no currency 
is used in order to express it. Nonsense. Likewise, Turing objected that the question 
involved vague concepts such as “machine” and “thinking”. In other words, it lacked 
a clear level of abstraction. So he suggested replacing it with the Imitation Game, 
which is exactly more manageable and less demanding because it fixes a rule-based 
scenario easily implementable and controllable (Moor 2003). By so doing, he 
specified a LoA—the “currency” he chose for the game was human intelligence, but 
could have been something else, from animal intelligence to human creativity, as 
many other versions of the Turing imitation game have shown—and asked a new 
question, which may be summed up thus: “may one conclude that a machine is 
thinking, at the Level of Abstraction represented by the imitation game?”. After half a 
century, philosophy is still learning such a crucial lesson.3 We can now turn to the 
second lesson, which will require a much longer premise. 
 
Lesson two: focusing on the most important problems or which philosophical 
questions to ask 
                                                
3 On the use of the method of levels of abstraction in philosophy, see (Floridi 2008) 
and (Floridi 2011). On Turing’s crucial role in the development of the method see 
(Floridi forthcoming). 
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On  23rd of April 2010, Bill Gates gave a talk at MIT in which he asked: “are the 
brightest minds working on the most important problems?” By “the most important 
problems” he meant “improving the lives of the poorest; improving education, health, 
nutrition”. Unfortunately, the list should probably include improving peaceful 
interactions, human rights, environmental conditions, living standards… and this is 
only the beginning. Clearly, the brightest philosophical minds should not be an 
exception, but turn their attention to such pressing challenges. Of course, one may 
stop philosophising and start doing something about this messy world instead. We 
may, in other words, close down our philosophy departments and never corrupt our 
brightest youths philosophically. Yet, such a solution smacks of self-defeat. It would 
be like deciding to burn the wicker basket in which we are travelling, because our hot 
air balloon is descending too quickly. Philosophy is what you need to keep in a good 
world, not what you want to get rid of in a bad one. Athens is a better place with 
Socrates. So there must be a different way forward. The fact is that philosophy can be 
extremely helpful, for it is philosophy, understood as conceptual design, that forges 
and refines the new ideas, theories, perspectives and, more generally, the intellectual 
framework that can then be used to understand and deal with the ultimate questions 
that challenge us so pressingly. In the team effort made by the brightest minds, the 
philosophical ones can contribute insights and visions, analyses and syntheses, 
heuristics and solutions that can empower us to tackle “the most important problems”. 
Every little effort helps in the battle against idiocy, obscurantism, intolerance, 
fanaticisms and fundamentalisms of all kinds, bigotry, prejudice and mere ignorance. 
If this sounds self-serving recall that the longer the jump forward is, the longer the 
run-up to it should be. Or, with a different metaphor, philosophy takes care of the 
roots, so that the rest of the plant might grow more healthily. Suppose we accept all 
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this as a reasonable assumption. Which ideas, theories, perspectives and, more 
generally, which intellectual framework should philosophers be designing now and 
for the foreseeable future, so that their contribution will be timely and helpful? Which 
philosophical questions should they be addressing? The answer would be 
inconceivable without Turing’s legacy, for it lies in the conceptual threads that run 
across so many of our “most important problems”. In a global information society, 
most of the crucial challenges that we are facing are linked to information and 
communication technologies, in terms of causes, effects, solutions, scientific 
investigations, actual improvements, conceptual resources needed to understand them, 
or even just the wealth required to tackle them, as Bill Gates’ example clearly shows. 
Obviously, information resources, technologies and sciences are not a panacea, but 
they are a crucial and powerful weapon in our fight against so many evils. The second 
lesson to be learnt from Turing therefore concerns the sort of questions that the 
brightest philosophical minds should be addressing.  Information and Communication 
Technologies have profoundly changed many aspects of life, including the nature of 
communication, education, work, entertainment, industrial production and business, 
health care, social relations, and armed conflicts. They have had a radical and 
widespread influence on our moral lives and on contemporary ethical debates. 
Examples come readily to mind, from trust online to phone hacking, from the digital 
divide to a dystopian “surveillance society”, from privacy and freedom of expression 
to Wikileaks, from artificial companions to cyberwar. In short, we live in an 
infosphere in which behind the most important problems often lies a Turing machine. 
It is a new world in which we have begun to re-conceptualise ourselves, a third lesson 
we have learnt from Turing, as I shall argue in the next section. 
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Lesson three: developing a new philosophical anthropology or from which 
perspective to approach philosophical questions 
Oversimplifying, science has two fundamental ways of changing our understanding. 
One may be called extrovert, or about the world, and the other introvert, or about 
ourselves. Three scientific revolutions have had great impact both extrovertly and 
introvertly. In changing our understanding of the external world and how we can 
interact with it, they also modified our conception of who we are and may expect to 
become. After Copernicus, the heliocentric cosmology displaced the Earth and hence 
humanity from the centre of the universe. Darwin showed that all species of life have 
evolved over time from common ancestors through natural selection, thus displacing 
humanity from the centre of the biological kingdom. And following Freud, we 
acknowledge nowadays that the mind is also unconscious and subject to the defence 
mechanism of repression, thus displacing it from the centre of pure rationality, a 
position that had been assumed as uncontroversial, at least since Descartes. The 
reader who, like Popper and myself, would be reluctant to follow Freud in considering 
psychoanalysis a strictly scientific enterprise like astronomy or evolutionary theory, 
might yet be willing to concede that contemporary neuroscience is a likely candidate 
for such a revolutionary role. Either way, the result is that, today, we acknowledge 
that we are not immobile, at the centre of the universe (Copernican revolution), we 
are not unnaturally separate and diverse from the rest of the animal kingdom 
(Darwinian revolution), and we are very far from being Cartesian minds entirely 
transparent to ourselves (Freudian or Neuroscientific revolution). 
One may easily question the value of this classic picture. After all, Freud 
(Freud 1917) himself was the first to interpret these three revolutions as part of a 
single process of reassessment of human nature (Weinert 2009). His hermeneutic 
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manoeuvre was, admittedly, rather self-serving. But it does strike a reasonable note. 
In a similar way, when we now perceive that something very significant and profound 
has happened to human life after the computer revolution, I would argue that our 
intuition is once again perceptive, because we are experiencing what may be 
described as a fourth revolution, in the process of dislocation and reassessment of 
humanity’s fundamental nature and role in the universe. This has been going on since 
the fifties and Turing is undoubtedly the representative figure of such a revolution. 
Computer science and the resulting technological applications have exercised both an 
extrovert and an introvert influence. They have not only provided unprecedented 
epistemic and engineering powers over natural and artificial realities; by doing so, 
they have also cast new light on who we are, how we are related to the world, and 
hence how we understand ourselves and who we might become. Today, we are slowly 
accepting the idea that we are not standalone and unique entities, but rather 
informationally embodied organisms (inforgs), mutually connected and embedded in 
an informational environment, the infosphere, which we share with both natural and 
artificial agents similar to us in many respects. Turing has changed our philosophical 
anthropology as much as Copernicus, Darwin and Freud ever did. This has had a 
significant impact on what it means to do philosophy after Turing, the last point to 
which I wish to call the reader’s attention. 
 
Lessons learnt: establishing a new philosophy of information or how to make 
sense of the world today 
What can enable humanity to make sense of our contemporary world, respect it and 
improve it responsibly, and hence help in solving “the most important problems”? 
The answer seems quite simple: a new philosophy of information. Among our 
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mundane and technical concepts, information is currently one of the most important, 
widely used yet least understood. The brightest philosophical minds should turn their 
attention to it in order to design the philosophy of our time properly conceptualised 
for our time. This is a quick and dirty way of introducing the philosophy of 
information (PI) as a much needed development in this history of philosophy. Let me 
now sketch the longer story that links it to Turing.  
Admittedly, it would be too much of a stretch to attribute to Turing the 
foundation or even the beginning of a new philosophy of information. After all, he 
never focused on the concept of information itself, or on problems about 
communication understood as information flow or transmission, despite the fact that 
he and Shannon knew each other’s work. Thus, the Index of (Turing 2004) does not 
even contain an entry for ‘information” and a book like (Luenberger 2006) mentions 
Turing only once, in relation to Bletchley Park. And yet, I would argue that without 
Turing, his groundbreaking work on information processing, the scientific and 
technological consequences of it, and the three lessons outlined above, contemporary 
interest in the philosophy of information would be very hard to explain. Turing shares 
with Shannon and Wiener the merit of having called our philosophical attention to the 
world of information and its dynamics. Without his three lessons, there would be no 
philosophy of information. The fact that nowadays we are more likely to treat 
computers as communication machines rather than powerful calculators and mobile 
phones as mini computers only indicates how deep the influence of Turing’s work has 
been on our world. 
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Conclusion 
The development of new philosophical ideas seems to be akin to economic 
innovation. For when Schumpeter adapted the idea of “creative destruction” in order 
to interpret economic innovation, he might as well have been talking about 
intellectual development.  Philosophy flourishes by constantly re-engineering itself. 
Nowadays, its pulling force of innovation is represented by the world of information, 
computation and communication phenomena, their corresponding sciences and 
technologies, and the new environments, social life, as well as the existential, cultural, 
economic and educational issues that they are bringing about. It is a new scenario that 
owes very much to Turing’s work and intellectual legacy. In the previous pages, I 
have sketched three philosophical lessons that we should learn from Turing. I 
suggested that the philosophy of information, insofar as it brings to fruition Turing’s 
legacy, can present itself as an innovative paradigm that opens up a very rich, helpful 
and timely area of conceptual investigations. PI seeks to expand the frontier of our 
philosophical understanding, by providing innovative methodologies to address our 
most important problems from a contemporary perspective. It relies on Turing’s 
intuition of the crucial importance of the method of abstraction to ensure that such 
problems are addressed in the right way. 
The scientific revolution made seventeenth century philosophers redirect their 
attention from the nature of the knowable object to the epistemic relation between it 
and the knowing subject, and hence from metaphysics to epistemology. The 
subsequent growth of the information society and the appearance of the infosphere, as 
the environment in which millions of people spend their lives nowadays, have led 
contemporary philosophy to privilege critical reflection first on the domain 
represented by the memory and languages of organised knowledge, the instruments 
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whereby the infosphere is managed – thus moving from epistemology to philosophy 
of language and logic – and then on the nature of its very fabric and essence, 
information itself and its dynamics, including communication, flows and processing. 
As a result, Information has arisen as a concept as fundamental and important as 
Being, knowledge, life, intelligence, meaning or good and evil – all pivotal concepts 
with which it is interdependent – and so equally worthy of autonomous investigation. 
It is also a more impoverished concept, in terms of which the others can be expressed 
and interrelated, when not defined. This is why the philosophy of information may 
explain and guide the purposeful construction of our intellectual environment, and 
provide the systematic treatment of the conceptual foundations of contemporary 
society. 
 The future of PI depends on how well we engage with Turing’s intellectual 
legacy, with “the most important problems” of our time, and with classic 
philosophical issues. I am optimistic. Thanks also to Turing, the Baconian-Galilean 
project of grasping and manipulating the alphabet of the universe has begun to find its 
fulfilment in the computational and informational revolution, which is affecting so 
profoundly our knowledge of reality and how we conceptualise it and ourselves 
within it. Informational narratives possess an ontic power, not as magical 
confabulations, expressions of theological logos or mystical formulae, but 
immanently, as building tools that can describe, modify, and implement our 
environment and ourselves. From this perspective, the philosophy of information can 
be presented as the study of the informational activities that make possible the 
construction, conceptualization, semanticisation (giving meaning to) and finally the 
moral stewardship of reality, both natural and artificial, both physical and 
anthropological. The philosophy of information enables humanity to make sense of 
 14 
the world and construct it responsibly. It promises to be one of the most exciting and 
beneficial areas of philosophical research of our time. Its development will be an 
appropriate way to continue Turing’s work and honour his legacy in philosophy.  
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